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PREFACE
 
This book provides a quantitative history of ﬁnancial crises in their 
various guises. Our basic message is simple: We have been here be­
fore. No matter how different the latest ﬁnancial frenzy or crisis al­
ways appears, there are usually remarkable similarities with past 
experience from other countries and from history. Recognizing these 
analogies and precedents is an essential step toward improving our 
global ﬁnancial system, both to reduce the risk of future crisis and to 
better handle catastrophes when they happen. 
If there is one common theme to the vast range of crises we 
consider in this book, it is that excessive debt accumulation, whether 
it be by the government, banks, corporations, or consumers, often 
poses greater systemic risks than it seems during a boom. Infusions of 
cash can make a government look like it is providing greater growth 
to its economy than it really is. Private sector borrowing binges can 
inﬂate housing and stock prices far beyond their long-run sustainable 
levels, and make banks seem more stable and proﬁtable than they re­
ally are. Such large-scale debt buildups pose risks because they make 
an economy vulnerable to crises of conﬁdence, particularly when 
debt is short term and needs to be constantly reﬁnanced. Debt-fueled 
booms all too often provide false afﬁrmation of a government’s poli­
cies, a ﬁnancial institution’s ability to make outsized proﬁts, or a 
country’s standard of living. Most of these booms end badly. Of course, 
debt instruments are crucial to all economies, ancient and modern, 
but balancing the risk and opportunities of debt is always a challenge, 
a challenge policy makers, investors, and ordinary citizens must never 
forget. 
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In this book we study a number of different types of ﬁnancial 
crises. They include sovereign defaults, which occur when a govern­
ment fails to meet payments on its external or domestic debt obliga­
tions or both. Then there are banking crises such as those the world 
has experienced in spades in the late 2000s. In a typical major bank­
ing crisis, a nation ﬁnds that a signiﬁcant part of its banking sector 
has become insolvent after heavy investment losses, banking panics, 
or both. Another important class of crises consists of exchange rate 
crises such as those that plagued Asia, Europe, and Latin America in 
the 1990s. In the quintessential exchange rate crisis, the value of a 
country’s currency falls precipitously, often despite a government 
“guarantee” that it will not allow this to happen under any circum­
stances. We also consider crises marked by bouts of very high inﬂa­
tion. Needless to say, unexpected increases in inﬂation are the de 
facto equivalent of outright default, for inﬂation allows all debtors 
(including the government) to repay their debts in currency that has 
much less purchasing power than it did when the loans were made. 
In much of the book we will explore these crises separately. But crises 
often occur in clusters. In the penultimate text chapter of the book 
we will look at situations—such as the Great Depression of the 1930s 
and the latest worldwide ﬁnancial crisis—in which crises occur in 
bunches and on a global scale. 
Of course, ﬁnancial crises are nothing new. They have been 
around since the development of money and ﬁnancial markets. Many 
of the earliest crises were driven by currency debasements that oc­
curred when the monarch of a country reduced the gold or silver con­
tent of the coin of the realm to ﬁnance budget shortfalls often 
prompted by wars. Technological advances have long since elimi­
nated a government’s need to clip coins to ﬁll a budget deﬁcit. But ﬁ­
nancial crises have continued to thrive through the ages, and they 
plague countries to this day. 
Most of our focus in this book is on two particular forms of 
crises that are particularly relevant today: sovereign debt crises and 
banking crises. Both have histories that span centuries and cut across 
regions. Sovereign debt crises were once commonplace among the now 
advanced economies that appear to have “graduated” from periodic 
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bouts of government insolvency. In emerging markets, however, re­
curring (or serial) default remains a chronic and serious disease. 
Banking crises, in contrast, remain a recurring problem everywhere. 
They are an equal-opportunity menace, affecting rich and poor coun­
tries alike. Our banking crisis investigation takes us on a tour from 
bank runs and bank failures in Europe during the Napoleonic Wars 
to the recent global ﬁnancial crises that began with the U.S. sub-
prime crisis of 2007. 
Our aim here is to be expansive, systematic, and quantita­
tive: our empirical analysis covers sixty-six countries over nearly 
eight centuries. Many important books have been written about the 
history of international ﬁnancial crises,1 perhaps the most famous of 
which is Kindleberger’s 1989 book Manias, Panics and Crashes.2 By 
and large, however, these earlier works take an essentially narrative 
approach, fortiﬁed by relatively sparse data. 
Here, by contrast, we build our analysis around data culled 
from a massive database that encompasses the entire world and goes 
back as far as twelfth-century China and medieval Europe. The core 
“life” of this book is contained in the (largely) simple tables and ﬁg­
ures in which these data are presented rather than in narratives of 
personalities, politics, and negotiations. We trust that our visual 
quantitative history of ﬁnancial crises is no less compelling than the 
earlier narrative approach, and we hope that it may open new vistas 
for policy analysis and research. 
Above all, our emphasis is on looking at long spans of history 
to catch sight of “rare” events that are all too often forgotten, although 
they turn out to be far more common and similar than people seem to 
think. Indeed, analysts, policy makers, and even academic economists 
have an unfortunate tendency to view recent experience through the 
narrow window opened by standard data sets, typically based on a nar­
row range of experience in terms of countries and time periods. A 
large fraction of the academic and policy literature on debt and de­
fault draws conclusions based on data collected since 1980, in no small 
part because such data are the most readily accessible. This approach 
would be ﬁne except for the fact that ﬁnancial crises have much longer 
cycles, and a data set that covers twenty-ﬁve years simply cannot give 
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one an adequate perspective on the risks of alternative policies and 
investments. An event that was rare in that twenty-ﬁve-year span may 
not be all that rare when placed in a longer historical context. After 
all, a researcher stands only a one-in-four chance of observing a 
“hundred-year ﬂood” in twenty-ﬁve years’ worth of data. To even be­
gin to think about such events, one needs to compile data for several 
centuries. Of course, that is precisely our aim here. 
In addition, standard data sets are greatly limited in several 
other important respects, especially in regard to their coverage of the 
types of government debt. In fact, as we shall see, historical data on 
domestically issued government debt is remarkably difﬁcult to obtain 
for most countries, which have often been little more transparent 
than modern-day banks with their off–balance sheet transactions 
and other accounting shenanigans. 
The foundations of our analysis are built on a comprehen­
sive new database for studying international debt and banking crises, 
inﬂation, and currency crashes and debasements. The data come from 
Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania 
(data from sixty-six countries in all, as previously noted, plus selected 
data for a number of other countries). The range of variables en­
compasses, among many other dimensions, external and domestic 
debt, trade, national income, inﬂation, exchange rates, interest rates, 
and commodity prices. The data coverage goes back more than eight 
hundred years, to the date of independence for most countries and 
well into the colonial period for several. Of course, we recognize that 
the exercises and illustrations that we provide here can only scratch 
the surface of what a data set of this scope and scale can potentially 
unveil. 
Fortunately, conveying the details of the data is not essential 
to understanding the main message of this book: we have been here 
before. The instruments of ﬁnancial gain and loss have varied over 
the ages, as have the types of institutions that have expanded might­
ily only to fail massively. But ﬁnancial crises follow a rhythm of boom 
and bust through the ages. Countries, institutions, and ﬁnancial in­
struments may change across time, but human nature does not. As we 
will discuss in the ﬁnal chapters of this book, the ﬁnancial crisis of 
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the late 2000s that originated in the United States and spread across 
the globe—which we refer to as the Second Great Contraction—is 
only the latest manifestation of this pattern. 
We take up the latest crisis in the ﬁnal four chapters before 
the conclusion, in which we review what we have learned; the reader 
should ﬁnd the material in chapters 13–16 relatively straightforward 
and self-contained. (Indeed, readers interested mainly in lessons of 
history for the latest crisis are encouraged to jump directly to this 
material in a ﬁrst reading.) We show that in the run-up to the sub-
prime crisis, standard indicators for the United States, such as asset 
price inﬂation, rising leverage, large sustained current account deﬁ­
cits, and a slowing trajectory of economic growth, exhibited virtually 
all the signs of a country on the verge of a ﬁnancial crisis—indeed, a 
severe one. This view of the way into a crisis is sobering; we show 
that the way out can be quite perilous as well. The aftermath of sys­
temic banking crises involves a protracted and pronounced contrac­
tion in economic activity and puts signiﬁcant strains on government 
resources. 
The ﬁrst part of the book gives precise deﬁnitions of concepts 
describing crises and discusses the data underlying the book. In the 
construction of our data set we have built heavily on the work of ear­
lier scholars. However, our data set also includes a considerable 
amount of new material from diverse primary and secondary sources. 
In addition to providing a systematic dating of external debt and ex­
change rate crises, the appendixes to this book catalog dates for do­
mestic inﬂation and banking crises. The dating of sovereign defaults 
on domestic (mostly local-currency) debt is one of the more novel 
features that rounds out our study of ﬁnancial crises. 
The payoff to this scrutiny comes in the remaining parts of 
the book, which apply these concepts to our expanded global data 
set. Part II turns our attention to government debt, chronicling hun­
dreds of episodes of default by sovereign nations on their debt to ex­
ternal creditors. These “debt crises” have ranged from those related 
to mid-fourteenth-century loans by Florentine ﬁnanciers to England’s 
Edward III to German merchant bankers’ loans to Spain’s Hapsburg 
Monarchy to massive loans made by (mostly) New York bankers to 
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Latin America during the 1970s. Although we ﬁnd that during the 
modern era sovereign external default crises have been far more con­
centrated in emerging markets than banking crises have been, we 
nevertheless emphasize that even sovereign defaults on external debt 
have been an almost universal rite of passage for every country as it 
has matured from an emerging market economy to an advanced de­
veloped economy. This process of economic, ﬁnancial, social, and 
political development can take centuries. 
Indeed, in its early years as a nation-state, France defaulted on 
its external debt no fewer than eight times (as we show in chapter 6)! 
Spain defaulted a mere six times prior to 1800, but, with seven defaults 
in the nineteenth century, surpassed France for a total of thirteen 
episodes. Thus, when today’s European powers were going through the 
emerging market phase of development, they experienced recurrent 
problems with external debt default, just as many emerging markets 
do today. 
From 1800 until well after World War II, Greece found itself 
virtually in continual default, and Austria’s record is in some ways 
even more stunning. Although the development of international 
capital markets was quite limited prior to 1800, we nevertheless cat­
alog the numerous defaults of France, Portugal, Prussia, Spain, and 
the early Italian city-states. At the edge of Europe, Egypt, Russia, and 
Turkey have histories of chronic default as well. 
One of the fascinating questions raised in our book is why a 
relatively small number of countries, such as Australia and New 
Zealand, Canada, Denmark, Thailand, and the United States, have 
managed to avoid defaults on central government debt to foreign 
creditors, whereas far more countries have been characterized by 
serial default on their external debts. 
Asian and African ﬁnancial crises are far less researched than 
those of Europe and Latin America. Indeed, the widespread belief 
that modern sovereign default is a phenomenon conﬁned to Latin 
America and a few poorer European countries is heavily colored 
by the paucity of research on other regions. As we shall see, pre-
communist China repeatedly defaulted on international debts, and 
modern-day India and Indonesia both defaulted in the 1960s, long 
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before the ﬁrst postwar round of Latin defaults. Postcolonial Africa 
has a default record that looks as if it is set to outstrip that of any pre­
viously emerging market region. Overall, we ﬁnd that a systematic 
quantitative examination of the postcolonial default records of Asia 
and Africa debunks the notion that most countries have avoided the 
perils of sovereign default. 
The near universality of default becomes abundantly clear in 
part II, where we begin to use the data set to paint the history of de­
fault and ﬁnancial crises in broad strokes using tables and ﬁgures. One 
point that certainly jumps out from the analysis is that the fairly re­
cent (2003–2008) quiet spell in which governments have generally 
honored their debt obligations is far from the norm. 
The history of domestic public debt (i.e., internally issued 
government debt) in emerging markets, in particular, has largely 
been ignored by contemporary scholars and policy makers (even by 
ofﬁcial data providers such as the International Monetary Fund), 
who seemed to view its emergence at the beginning of the twenty-
ﬁrst century as a stunning new phenomenon. Yet, as we will show in 
part III, domestic public debt in emerging markets has been ex­
tremely signiﬁcant during many periods and in fact potentially helps 
resolve a host of puzzles pertaining to episodes of high inﬂation and 
default. We view the difﬁculties one experiences in ﬁnding data on 
government debt as just one facet of the general low level of trans­
parency with which most governments maintain their books. Think 
of the implicit guarantees given to the massive mortgage lenders that 
ultimately added trillions to the effective size of the U.S. national 
debt in 2008, the trillions of dollars in off–balance sheet transactions 
engaged in by the Federal Reserve, and the implicit guarantees in­
volved in taking bad assets off bank balance sheets, not to mention 
unfunded pension and medical liabilities. Lack of transparency is en­
demic in government debt, but the difﬁculty of ﬁnding basic histor­
ical data on central government debt is almost comical. 
Part III also offers a ﬁrst attempt to catalog episodes of overt 
default on and rescheduling of domestic public debt across more than 
a century. (Because so much of the history of domestic debt has 
largely been forgotten by scholars, not surprisingly, so too has its his-
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tory of default.) This phenomenon appears to be somewhat rarer 
than external default but is far too common to justify the extreme as­
sumption that governments always honor the nominal face value of 
domestic debt, an assumption that dominates the economics litera­
ture. When overt default on domestic debt does occur, it appears to 
occur in situations of greater duress than those that lead to pure ex­
ternal default—in terms of both an implosion of output and a marked 
escalation of inﬂation. 
Part IV broadens our discussion to include crises related to 
banking, currency, and inﬂation. Until very recently, the study of 
banking crises has typically focused either on earlier historical expe­
riences in advanced countries, mainly the banking panics before 
World War II, or on modern-day experiences in emerging markets. 
This dichotomy has perhaps been shaped by the belief that for ad­
vanced economies, destabilizing, systemic, multicountry ﬁnancial 
crises are a relic of the past. Of course, the recent global ﬁnancial cri­
sis emanating out of the United States and Europe has dashed this 
misconception, albeit at great social cost. 
The fact is that banking crises have long plagued rich and 
poor countries alike. We reach this conclusion after examining bank­
ing crises ranging from Denmark’s ﬁnancial panic during the Napole­
onic Wars to the recent ﬁrst global ﬁnancial crisis of the twenty-ﬁrst 
century. The incidence of banking crises proves to be remarkably 
similar in the high- and the middle- to low-income countries. Bank­
ing crises almost invariably lead to sharp declines in tax revenues as 
well as signiﬁcant increases in government spending (a share of 
which is presumably dissipative). On average, government debt rises 
by 86 percent during the three years following a banking crisis. These 
indirect ﬁscal consequences are thus an order of magnitude larger 
than the usual costs of bank bailouts. 
Episodes of treacherously high inﬂation are another recur­
rent theme. No emerging market country in history has managed to 
escape bouts of high inﬂation. Indeed, there is a very strong parallel 
between our proposition that few countries have avoided serial de­
fault on external debt and the proposition that few countries have 
avoided serial bouts of high inﬂation. Even the United States has had 
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a checkered history, including in 1779, when the inﬂation rate ap­
proached 200 percent. Early on across the world, as already noted, 
the main device for defaulting on government obligations was that 
of debasing the content of the coinage. Modern currency presses 
are just a technologically advanced and more efﬁcient approach to 
achieving the same end. As a consequence, a clear inﬂationary 
bias throughout history emerges. Starting in the twentieth century, 
inﬂation spiked radically higher. Since then, inﬂation crises have 
stepped up to a higher plateau. Unsurprisingly, then, the more mod­
ern period also has seen a higher incidence of exchange rate crashes 
and larger median changes in currency values. Perhaps more surpris­
ing, and made visible only by a broader historical context, are the 
early episodes of pronounced exchange rate instability, notably dur­
ing the Napoleonic Wars. 
Just as ﬁnancial crises have common macroeconomic an­
tecedents in asset prices, economic activity, external indicators, and 
so on, so do common patterns appear in the sequencing (temporal 
order) in which crises unfold, the ﬁnal subject of part IV. 
The concluding chapter offers some reﬂections on crises, pol­
icy, and pathways for academic study. What is certainly clear is that 
again and again, countries, banks, individuals, and ﬁrms take on ex­
cessive debt in good times without enough awareness of the risks 
that will follow when the inevitable recession hits. Many players in 
the global ﬁnancial system often dig a debt hole far larger than they 
can reasonably expect to escape from, most famously the United 
States and its ﬁnancial system in the late 2000s. Government and 
government-guaranteed debt (which, due to deposit insurance, often 
implicitly includes bank debt) is certainly the most problematic, 
for it can accumulate massively and for long periods without being put 
in check by markets, especially where regulation prevents them from 
effectively doing so. Although private debt certainly plays a key role 
in many crises, government debt is far more often the unifying prob­
lem across the wide range of ﬁnancial crises we examine. As we stated 
earlier, the fact that basic data on domestic debt are so opaque and dif­
ﬁcult to obtain is proof that governments will go to great lengths to 
hide their books when things are going wrong, just as ﬁnancial insti­
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Figure P.1. Sovereign external debt, 1800–2008: Percentage of countries in 
external default or restructuring weighted by their share of world income. 
tutions have done in the contemporary ﬁnancial crisis. We see a ma­
jor role for international policy-making organizations, such as the In­
ternational Monetary Fund, in providing government debt accounts 
that are more transparent than those available today. 
Our immersion in the details of crises that have arisen over 
the past eight centuries and in data on them has led us to conclude 
that the most commonly repeated and most expensive investment 
advice ever given in the boom just before a ﬁnancial crisis stems from 
the perception that “this time is different.” That advice, that the old 
rules of valuation no longer apply, is usually followed up with vigor. 
Financial professionals and, all too often, government leaders ex­
plain that we are doing things better than before, we are smarter, and 
we have learned from past mistakes. Each time, society convinces it­
self that the current boom, unlike the many booms that preceded cat­
astrophic collapses in the past, is built on sound fundamentals, 
structural reforms, technological innovation, and good policy. 
Given the sweeping data on which this book has been built, 
it is simply not possible to provide textural context to all the hun­
dreds of episodes the data encompass. Nevertheless, the tables and 
ﬁgures speak very powerfully for themselves of the phenomenal re­
current nature of the problem. Take ﬁgure P.1, which shows the per-
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centage of countries worldwide, weighted by GDP, that have been in 
a state of default on their external debt at any time. 
The short period of the 2000s, represented by the right-hand 
tail of the chart, looks sufﬁciently benign. But was it right for so many 
policy makers to declare by 2005 that the problem of sovereign de­
fault on external debt had gone into deep remission? Unfortunately, 
even before the ink is dry on this book, the answer will be clear 
enough. We hope that the weight of evidence in this book will give 
future policy makers and investors a bit more pause before next they 
declare, “This time is different.” It almost never is. 
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